We run regression analyses on a hand-collected dataset including 507 IPOs on the UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) from FY 2004 to FY 2010 and provide new empirical evidence that venture capitalists (VCs) do grandstand firms and strike quid pro quo agreements with underwriters, thus increasing the underpricing level. The grandstanding and spinning hypotheses also hold when controlling for IPO years and industries. We document that when VCs behave in this way they do not assume any certification role with respect to managed firms. JEL Classification Codes: G24, G32 
Introduction
We conduct an empirical test on a hand-collected dataset, which includes 507 IPOs occurred on the London Stock Exchange Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in United Kingdom from FY 2004 to FY 2010 order to address the relationship between venture funds and underpricing in new listings. The collected sample has been firstly split into two pools: the first one containing venture capital backed IPOs (99 observations) and the second with non-venture capital backed ones (408 observations) . The descriptive analysis immediately shows that venture capital backed issues are on average more underpriced. By employing OLS regressions with the IPO underpricing as the main dependent variable and grandstanding and spinning proxies as the main explanatory variables we find evidence that grandstanding and spinning hypotheses do explain IPO underpricing. These evidence hold also when controlling for industries and years. We provide also some temporal insights dividing the timeframe between the pre-crisis period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and the post-crisis period (2008) (2009) (2010) .
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, the focus on the AIM allows to investigate our hypotheses on a market specifically conceived to give an exit to VCs and more importantly, with much larger degree of variation in investors and listed companies countries and sectors.
1 As such, this limitedly exploited market provides a fertile testing ground for the grandstanding and spinning hypotheses with only marginal data snooping issues. Secondly, by excluding the dotcom bubble period we specifically test a more general form the grandstanding and spinning theories and we answer the question of whether this VCs behavior was specific to a unique environment such as the Internet bubble or is a structural bias in the investment and exit processes.
Finally we extend our analysis to the crisis period and provide further insight on the exit decision process by investors in both favorable and unfavorable market conditions.
1 London Stock Exchange website defines the AIM Market as the "London Stock Exchange's international market for smaller growing companies (where)…a wide range of businesses including early stage, venture capital backed as well as more established companies join (it) seeking access to growth capital." Since its establishment in 1995 more than 3,000 companies joined AIM from across the globe. At the end of 2011 a total of 1,143 companies were listed, 225 of which were non-UK.
Literature review
The question arisen all over the years is if venture capitalists increase or not the average underpricing. A first group of theories claims that venture capitalists assume a certification role on behalf of managed firms through monitoring activities. This should allow VCs to reduce the asymmetric information and then the underpricing, as confirmed by Barry et al. (1990) , whose hypotheses state that the certification role and the complementary monitoring activity would be seen as the main causes decreasing the investors' uncertainty. 2 Supporting evidence is offered by Megginson and Weiss (1991) , who affirm that VCs are able to certify that the offer price reflects all the private information, so that the initial share price can be equal to the intrinsic share fair value, excluding mispricing issues. Megginson et al. (1991) also argue that VC backed companies attract prestigious underwriters, which should reduce underpricing and then decrease the cost of going public, as confirmed by Carter and Manaster (1991) . Since the authors find that VCs are usually the major shareholders, if they retain a large part of their shares at the IPO, the certification role should be easily ensured. Moreover, VCs are able to head companies to the market earlier (Megginson et al., 1991) . 3 As proved by Sahlman (1990) , retention of a portion of their holdings gives VCs credibility in their role of certification. Selling the whole participation at the IPO date may be seen as a negative signal by the market, which will reconsider the reputation level assigned to the fund.
Moreover, it must be costly for issuers to purchase the reputational capital of the certifier and the authors assert that VCs are the most suitable source of financing for young rapidly growing companies, focusing their attention on high-tech businesses. 4 The importance of the certification role is also underlined by Chahine et al. (2006) , who claim that on average VC backed IPOs in UK are less underpriced than non VC backed ones. Some studies about the reputation issue have been presented by Lin and Smith (1995) and by Neus and Walz (2004) . Lin and Smith assert that venture capitalists are perceived as insiders, and a strong sale of stocks at the IPO time would be seen as a negative signal by the market. In fact, since VCs generally hold part of their positions beyond the IPO as well, selling the majority or the whole stake would conduce outsiders to consider overpriced the new issue. Empirical analyses conducted by the authors confirm that VCs are aware that holding their positions at the IPO is a proof to underwriters and to the market that they are not acting opportunistically. Contributions brought by Neus et al. (2004) show that venture capital funds face a trade-off: although the fund reputation is a determinant key to get future financing, it is also true that postponing the exit time will bring VCs to waste many investment opportunities. Since VCs live for a short period of time and they request rates of returns up to 50% (Sahlman, 1990) , a high share overhang (calculated as shares retained/shares issued) could be associated to high six-months underpricing, which might be the future compensation for venture capitalists when final exit occurs.
The previous comment leads us to the second school of thought about VCs and underpricing. The main finding is on the contrary that VCs increase underpricing, but many different explanations may be given. An exclusive interpretation is provided by Bradley and Jordan (2002) , who find that VC backed IPOs are more underpriced than non-VC backed ones. They find no evidence about VC certification role, and agree with some other studies that hot issue periods are usually more underpriced than the others. 5 More to the point, one of the first issue to discuss is if
VCs take companies public during high market peaks (Lerner, 1994) and if yes, what the main explanation for that is. As stated by Gompers et al. (2005) , VCs effectively have great success during hot issue periods, so it can be assumed that during bubbles VCs underprice more. In fact,
investors have incentives to buy what they perceive to be quality securities, generating what is generally called a "cascade effect". The latter consideration is supported by Bessler and Seim (2011) , who recently conducted a research about the underpricing of the venture capital backed IPOs in Europe. Testing their assumptions on a sample of European IPOs, they find that the underpricing level, especially for venture capital backed IPOs, is higher during hot issue periods, such as the dotcom bubble and the pre-financial crisis period. 6 However, the authors show that underpricing experienced by European markets during 1998-2000 is much higher than the observed level during 2003-2007. 7 A further supporting test has been provided by Oehler et al. (2004) , who argue that in certain periods underpricing is not really given by ex-ante uncertainty, but by the investor sentiment and demand. They empirically proved their hypothesis using a sample based on German IPOs.
5 Nevertheless, they do not address underpricing to opportunistic behaviors of VCs, nor to agreements between venture capitalists and banks. They just think that VCs usually operate in highly underpriced sectors, and after controlling for industries, they show that venture-backing is not directly a determinant for underpricing. 6 Obviously, VCs may take advantage of their huge expertise heading managed companies to the market during economic booms, in order to exploit the investor sentiment and their reputation of certifiers. 7 Clearly, this can be partially explained considering the dotcom boom as an equity capital market phenomenon, while the pre-crisis period was featured by an explosion on the real estate market. When the bubble burst in [2007] [2008] , equity markets suffered due to some events strongly linked to the real estate mortgages default. Previous statements would confirm that underpricing seriously skyrockets when the economic boom is strictly correlated to the equity capital market, and when the latter is not affected by external events which bring to panic selling and speculations.
But why should VC backed IPOs experience a higher underpricing than non-venture backed issues? What are the main reasons provided by this school of thought to justify such an assertion? It is well known that the main explanations regard the grandstanding theory (Gompers, 1996) and the spinning hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) . Gompers (1996) states that underpricing is a natural consequence of the greater risk perceived by the market when venture capital funds take very young companies public, since these are still very risky due to their lifecycle phase. In fact, during the first years of their existence, companies are not capable of supporting their operations with internal resources. Thus, they are not able to get entirely financed by streams of incoming cash-flows. This is why they still need a strong partnership with a reliable source of financing, which can drive them towards the second phase of their lifecycle. It is obvious that when grandstanding theory holds, VCs are acting opportunistically, looking for a quick exit in order to cash out and catch some more opportunities. Dynamics and implications of grandstanding will be discussed in details in the next paragraph. The second main reason related to VCs and underpricing is presented by Loughran et al. (2004) , and implies an agreement between IPO decision makers and the bank sponsoring the IPO. Underwriters may find convenient to underprice shares, especially to
give clients great initial returns, which increases their reputation and makes their services much more marketable. At the same time, VC managers tolerate underpricing because they get indications about other hot and underpriced allocations, which will allow them to obtain some personal risk- 
Grandstanding theory
One of the main causes for VC backed IPOs underpricing is explained by the grandstanding theory (Gompers, 1996) . According to Sirri and Tufano (1993) and to Lee and Wahal (2004) , reputation is a key factor for venture capital firms. In fact, their funding activity is strictly correlated to past performance, which is often measured by the number of IPOs sponsored by each fund (Sirri and Tufano, 1993) . The finite lifetime of venture partnership leads to frequent recapitalizations, considering that a venture capitalist is supposed to cease operations if not raising money. In order to obtain funds to recapitalize and invest in new projects, VCs need a strong reputation, often given by quick and excellent results. This is why Gompers (1996) states that VCs, especially if young, take companies to the market after a few years. 8 In his study, Gompers finds that on average VCs head companies to the market after four-five years. This finding is also supported by Lee and Wahal (2004) . 9 Leading companies to IPOs is a clear signal, which provides with strong evidence of highly developed skills in managing portfolios very aggressively, with the end of obtaining elevated returns in a few years. In fact, Sahlman (1990) proves that the biggest portion of VCs returns is earned on IPO operations. Of course, if a venture capital firm manages companies that eventually go public, the market and its sources of financing would consider that VC reliable and outperforming. This would bring that VC to raise more money in order to invest in plenty of projects, which is a desirable effect when investment risk profiles are different and thus diversification is needed. 10 As argued by Welch (1989) , Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) , Allen and Faulhalber (1989) , underpricing may belong to a defined strategy reported by their signaling models. To sum up their models, underpricing would be seen as a signal of quality given by the issuer to the market, since only a good company is able to bear such a cost and recoup in the future after leaving a lot of money on the table. Then, if VCs need to exit completely from the investment in order to get money to be used in other projects, that means that underpricing is a strong burden for venture capital firms. In fact, while in other researches is argued that VCs remain on the board of directors even beyond the IPO, a VC which needs to rush will not be able to wait a lot of time before cashing out (Gompers, 1996) . This leads to another consideration: the stake held by VCs that need to sell most of their shares at the IPO must not be large, so that wealth losses due to underpricing may be reduced (Gompers, 1996) . 11 Lin and Smith (1998) find that the cost VCs will 8 . Gompers affirms that young VCs usually grandstand because they are anxious to build a solid reputation, which will consent them to have access to new sources of financing. Although it is empirically shown that young VCs grandstand more than old ones, it must be said that VCs grandstand in general. This may be caused by hot issue periods, which offer plenty of investment opportunities to be caught by VCs, which then need money to invest in several different ideas. 9 A former model developed by Gompers (1993) shows that VCs prefer to bear the cost of underpricing by taking companies public after a few years than trying to maximize their return upon a single investment. Limited partnerships usually live for a short period of time, such as ten years. This means that returns must be earned quickly, and that the more investments they carry on, the more return opportunities they create (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) . 10 Clearly, young VCs are much more prone to grandstand than old and well-established venture capital firms. Nevertheless, also old VCs have incentives to grandstand, since also their limited partnerships need to obtain high returns quickly with the aim of pursuing other investment opportunities. Beside that, if venture capital firms rush companies to the market, the risk perceived will be higher. It is easy to figure out that a young company is risky, because its operating cycle is not able to provide long-lasting streams of cash flows. In fact, according to Caselli (2010) , venture capitalist should take managed firms public when they experience the maturity phase of their lifecycle. Therefore, the greater ex-ante uncertainty of early-stage companies brings to higher underpricing, because investors purchasing those risky securities will require a higher risk premium, given a higher risk profile. The perceived risk may decrease if venture capitalists remain on the board of directors even after the IPO: the market would see a high share retention as a signal of quality, thus diminishing the required return. 11 This statement is not actually very coherent with other theories arguing that the more the share overhang (calculated as shares retained by the leading VC/shares issued by the company), the more the underpricing, since VCs would not care about it when the majority of the stake is retained. Sometimes, VCs retain shares expecting an increasing trend of the stock price.
be bearing if heading companies to the market too early is strongly connected to the percentage of shares retained. Obviously, retaining too many shares do not allow VCs to reposition their resources somewhere else. At the same time, Lin et al. (1998) also argue that high reputation VCs experience less underpricing when selling the majority of their shares. This probably happens because the market does not see a negative signal in this behavior, since well-established VCs have a solid reputation. Thus, no big risk premiums are required through the underpricing.
In conclusion, the magnitude of the cost VCs are supposed to bear when taking prematurely companies to the market depends on the portion of stake held in the company and on the necessity to cash out. Young VCs need to realize capital gains in a short period in order to use those resources in other projects. Then, they will bear the cost of underpricing, because they will not be able to wait for long-term returns, moreover they are eager to signal quality by taking managed firms public (Lee and Wahal, 2004) . 12 As a final point, it can be claimed that the kind of cost experienced depends on the age of the venture capital fund (Gompers, 1996) . Stein (1988) stays on the same side of Gompers, Lee and Wahal. Even if the grandstanding theory was formulated in the nineties, he anticipated some of the main concepts and implications. He states that conflicts of interests may arise between VCs and founders, addressing the explanation to what he calls "managerial myopia". In fact, VCs could act opportunistically, pursuing returns in a short-term horizon, while entrepreneurs are much more focused on the long-term perspective. But how do VCs succeed in taking companies public and then exiting so easily? According to Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) , there are some contractual covenants that allow VCs to exit with no struggles, such as the "Demand rights", which consents VCs to head a company to the market even if the management does not agree. Another important covenant is the "Drag-Along", which gives VCs the right to impose their views about selling if they find support on boards and among the major shareholders.
13
Focusing the attention on UK, Jelic et al. (2005) conducted a research about VC backed MBOs, finding that they are usually more underpriced than non-VC backed ones. The same result has been found by Espenlaub et al. (2000) , who claim that VCs tend to grandstand, especially if they are young. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that although Barnes and McCarthy (2002) state that VCs usually take companies public after a few years, they find no evidence that VC 12 On top of that, Lee and Wahal (2004) find a positive relation between the first-day return and VCs' funding activities, giving evidence that underpricing is sometimes a necessary cost, which will probably bring some benefits in the future. On the contrary, old VCs will probably hold their position in the company, but will not be able to use immediately their capital gains in order to finance new projects. This does not represent a big problem, since they are well-established. In fact, their reputation will surely give them the chance to catch some other financing opportunities.
13 Gifford (1997) gives one more evidence about young VCs taking companies public prematurely. She argues that young VCs do not have the chance to invest in high-quality companies, thus they address their efforts on lower quality firms. This kind of companies must be often monitored, allowing VCs to head them to the market earlier than usual. He does not mention any kind of relation with underpricing, though.
backed IPOs are significantly more underpriced than non-VC backed. In fact, they argue that young VCs usually rush companies to the market and that they will obtain new funds sooner than old VCs, according to the reputation theory discussed at the beginning of this paragraph. Despite of this, VCs do not seem to bear the cost of underpricing. Given theories previously analyzed, this finding seems to be contradictory and illogical, because it is undefined why the market should not ask for a greater compensation when purchasing shares issued by a risky company, nor there is any doubt that young and going public companies have a high risk profile. In fact, they structurally present a greater exante uncertainty, given by factors related to the first phase of their lifecycle.
Spinning practice
When explaining the underpricing phenomenon, Loughran and Ritter (2004) consider a variety of explanations. As documented by Ritter (1984) , riskier IPOs are more underpriced. So, it has been widely assumed in literature that underpricing is a form of compensation offered to investors that face a greater risk. This theory is known as the changing risk composition hypothesis (Loughran et al., 2004) . One more explanation regards what the authors call the realignment of incentives hypothesis, which implies that issuers accept to leave money on the table for several reasons. The third and last theory proposed is the changing issuer objective function hypothesis. The latter may be split into two parts. The first one is known as the analyst lust hypothesis, which claims that issuers will let underwriters underprice new issues in exchange of future analyst coverage, which would provide with strong buy recommendations about issuer's shares. The second hypothesis is related to the spinning practice, which is supposed to be one of the main reasons why VC backed IPOs are usually more underpriced, on average (if they are). Basically, issuers would look for underwriters with a reputation of underpricing new issues. This may happen for a lot of motives. First of all, underwriters find convenient to underprice new shares, so that they will be able to offer their clients high first-day returns, which will increment their reputation and thus the number of subscribers (and commissions paid). Since underwriters use the bookbuilding method, their discretion in allocating shares would eliminate completely both the winner's curse problem and any kind of asymmetric information (Loughran et al., 2004) . Second, a quid pro quo agreement arises between the issuer and the bank. In fact, since the issuer tolerates underpricing, it must receive something back. Usually, IPO decision makers get side payments, since underwriters give them indications about other hot issues. Therefore, VCs' managers would benefit personally from underpricing, obtaining in exchange suggestions about quick return opportunities. Furthermore, banks usually promise them to sponsor their future trips to the market, which will allow VCs to set up convenient relations with underwriters (UWs) and then head companies to the market more easily. 14 In 2006 an interesting research has been conducted by Coakley et al. (2006) on the UK market. The authors do not find any empirical evidence that VCs grandstand and that they build relationships with banks that lead to spinning behaviors. Nevertheless, during bubble years (1998) (1999) (2000) they show that grandstanding and spinning become significant, proving that during those years a lot of institutions acted opportunistically in order to exploit the investors sentiment.
Data and methodology

Data mining
Dataset used companies went public on that market, then 44.79% of the total number of IPOs has been included in the sample. 15 The list of IPOs has been taken from the London Stock Exchange website, which also discloses the IPO date and sector for each firm gone public. SEOs and reallocations from the Main Market to AIM have been excluded. Initially, around 50% of the total number of IPOs was taken into account, but after the outliers detection some observations have been deleted from the sample. Thus, percentages of IPOs for each year considered range between 43% and 48%. Outliers deleted from the sample were far from the mean at least +/-five times the standard deviation.
Outliers detection regards two variables: first-day underpricing and total money raised, hence the only data available on Bloomberg before analyzing IPO prospectuses one by one. As said before, the final result leads to a sample of 507 observations. Delisted companies have been also considered, taking into account successful and unsuccessful examples. The sample is divided into venture capital backed IPOs (99 observations) and non-venture capital backed IPOs (408 14 One more contribution about the issue is provided by Arthurs et al. (2008) , who elaborate a multiple agency theory model which includes three different actors: 1) the lead venture capital fund, 2) the lead underwriting bank, 3) the owners of the going public company. They state that VCs and underwriters have a short-term vision, then they have incentives to cooperate and create relationships in order to pursue their own interests. Long-term relationships with banks are actually fundamental for VCs to continue their investment activity, so they will accept the underpricing cost in exchange of indications about new hot issues. VCs can impose underpricing to the going public firm because they have a strong contractual power upon the backed company, plus entrepreneurs often prefer to have their personal wealth increased than overpricing new issues. arise from anomalous trends given by the financial industry, models have been controlled also when financial firms are excluded from the sample. Information about financial data, money raised and initial offer prices has been collected both from the IPO prospectuses and from Bloomberg: this made possible to double-check information given by both sides, in order to verify its accuracy.
Whenever a mismatch occurred, data found in the IPO prospectuses were considered more reliable.
Sales to Total Assets ratio is built through Pre-IPO financial data. 18 Currency used is the GBP.
Dates of incorporation have been collected by IPO prospectuses or companies' websites, in order to calculate the age of the firm going public. Whenever the incorporation date did not coincide with the foundation date, the former has not been considered indicative. 19 Underpricing has been calculated as the percentage differential of the first-day closing price and the offer price. Both prices have been found on Bloomberg, and the offer price has been compared to information given by the IPO prospectus, which also provides with data regarding the amount of shares issued and total money raised. Information about leading NOMADs and brokers come from the IPO list given by the London Stock Exchange website. Brokers operate also as NOMADs in most of the IPOs included in the dataset. Whenever this does not happen, the underwriter ranking -which is used to calculate the proxy representing the spinning practice -is related to the broker. The underwriter ranking is usually provided by Carter and Manaster's index, which ranked U.S. underwriters on a scale zero to nine, whereas a rank of eight or nine is given to prestigious underwriters.
Unfortunately, since the analysis has been made on the UK market, some NOMADs/brokers are not 16 In order to find out if a firm was VC backed or not, the IPO prospectus of each company has been analyzed. The AIM Rule 26 obliges companies to disclose information about the pre-IPO ownership structure, which is necessary to determine if a company was supported by one or more venture capital funds. 
Dataset Description
Insert Table I Insert Table II about here The average underpricing is 16.7%, which is coherent with the average evidence reported in previous studies (Ibbotson et. al., 1994) . Venture capital backed IPOs underpricing has been found to be extremely high (25.80%), while non-venture capital backed IPOs are underpriced less than the average (14.60%). The underpricing differential is then 11.20%, which clearly shows the venture capital backed IPOs are on average much more underpriced than non-venture capital backed ones. This is a fundamental consideration for the analysis we perform in the next section, because descriptive data show that the certification role of VCs does not work as argued by Barry et 20 We are aware of the bias that may be generated by this criterion, since the quantity of sponsored IPOs is not always synonymous of quality. Nevertheless, it must be said that Nomads have a particular role in the AIM regulation. Therefore, the number of sponsored IPOs seems to be the most appropriate choice to represent reputation, because it should reflect the underwriter's credibility and how much going public firms trust it. Since it has been stated that VCs grandstand companies in order to increase the number of sponsored IPOs and then improve their reputation, it can be argued that also the number of operations made by underwriters is strictly related to their reputation. Given the above criterion, it was not possible to calculate the average underwriter rank for the whole sample and for VC backed or non-VC backed observations. al. (1990) and by Megginson and Weiss (1991) . On the contrary, it seems that data support the second school of thought discussed in section 2 (Lee and Wahal, 2004) , but it still must be proved that these results are caused by VCs' moral hazard behaviors, such as grandstanding (Gompers, 1996) and spinning (Loughran and Ritter, 2004 Insert Table III Insert Table V and Table VI 
Variables and variables definitions
In the following lines we describe the variables that are employed in the OLS regression framework of our study.
I.
% Underpricing: calculated as the percentage differential between the closing price after the first day of trading and the initial offer price, it represents the dependent variable used in regressions. Prices are in GBP.
II.
VC dummy: indicating venture-backing. A value of one represents venture capital backed IPOs.
III.
AGE: age is measured as the difference between the IPO date and the incorporation/foundation date and represents the timeframe to go public. Young companies are supposed to be more underpriced than old ones, given a higher level of uncertainty.
Coefficients are then supposed to be negative.
IV.
SALES/ TOT. ASSETS Ratio: sales do not always reveal fundamental information, because they must be compared to the firm's size. This is why this ratio has been created and Total
Assets ( 
VI.
UW dummy: a value of one represents prestigious underwriters (underwriters with a rank of 8 or 9). If the spinning theory is true, a prestigious UW should increase the underpricing and coefficients be positive. Results may vary depending on the period of time considered.
VII.
MATURITY INDEX: it is built through the interaction between AGE and SALES/ASSETS ratio. It is supposed to be high for low-risk companies that should experience a low level of underpricing. Therefore, coefficients are supposed to be negative. 
VIII.
CRISIS dummy:
IX.
GRANDSTANDING: a proxy of grandstanding has been produced through the interaction between VC dummy and Young Firm Dummy (Flagg, 2007) . Young Firm Dummy assigns a value of one to going public companies aged zero to four, while it gives a value of zero to older companies, aged five or more. According to Gompers (1996) , grandstanding should explain why VC backed IPOs are more underpriced. If this theory holds, coefficients are expected to be positive. Grandstanding dummy is going to have a value of one when the considered observation is a VC backed company that went public aged zero to four.
X.
SPINNING: a proxy of spinning is built multiplying VC dummy by UW dummy (Flagg, 2007) . If the spinning theory (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) is validated, this variable should explain and increase the underpricing. A value of one is assigned to VC backed companies that had been sponsored by prestigious UWs, a value of zero is given to the others.
Coefficients are expected to be positive if prestigious UWs and VCs increase the underpricing level when working together.
XI.
IPO year dummies: IPO years have been used as controlling variables. In fact, financial firms are unlikely to be venture capital backed, underpriced and old when going public. Many financial companies go public after a few months from their incorporation, because their aim is to raise money on the equity capital market in order to start their activity.
XII.
Empirical Results and Discussion
In this section, results obtained through OLS regressions are presented. The main analysis has been conducted on the whole sample, using variables described in section 3.3. After discussing the main results, the analysis will focus shortly on the pre-crisis and the crisis periods, in order to determine and compare the main trends occurring in two different economic cycles.
Analysis of the overall period (2004-2010)
The main aim of the first two models used for analysis is to figure out if with the amount of money raised through IPOs (in relation to the firm's size). Another extremely significant variable is CRISIS DUMMY, which indicates that underpricing strongly decreases during the financial crisis. Furthermore, there are a few VC-backed observations in those years. In fact, VCs usually take companies public in hot issue periods in order to exploit positive trends, as argued by Lerner (1994) and Gompers et al. (2005) . As far as AGE is concerned, it shows a negative coefficient and it is significant at a confidence level equivalent to .966 which can be considered quite a good result. Therefore, it can be argued that the older a company is, the less the underpricing (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1989) , both because uncertainty around old firms is smaller and because old companies are less likely to be VC backed, hence diminishing on average the probability of facing high underpricing, as seen before. The only variable which is barely significant at a confidence level equal to .90 is UW DUMMY, which is quite correlated to VC DUMMY (-0.427 
Insert Table IX about here
In further analysis, some other variables have been added in order to enrich the model and make additional investigations. The first predictor added is the share overhang. In the model, SHARE OVERHANG has a positive coefficient, thus it should increase the underpricing (see Table   X ). Although the other variables are significant (except for CRISIS DUMMY, which is insignificant), SHARE OVERHANG has a very high p-value (.13). This does not allow any certain consideration about this predictor, therefore it is not possible to state that the effect shown by the model is absolutely correct. 25 The adjusted R-squared is here quite satisfying (.168) and the F test shows a p-value of .000.
25 Literature regarding the relation about share overhang and underpricing is quite broad and confused. Megginson and Weiss (1991) point out that selling shares at the IPO would be perceived as a negative signal by the market, thus VCs that retain the majority of their stake are basically assuming a strong certification role and then the underpricing should be decreased. Another similar theory is proposed by Lin and Smith (1995) , who argue that whenever VCs sell a lot of shares at the IPO date, outsiders would consider overpriced the issue and would ask for higher remuneration. On the contrary, Neus and Walz (2004) claim that when VCs retain a big portion of their stake at the IPO, they will probably seek for a greater future compensation, since they are not able to replace their resources immediately. Thus, the share price is expected to increase in the long-run, when final exit occurs. On top of that, the authors do not clarify what is the MATURITY INDEX is then added to the model (see Table X 
Insert Table X about here
All the previous models show that venture-backing increments strongly the underpricing phenomenon. Despite of this, after controlling for grandstanding and spinning, which are both statistically significant, it is proved that venture-backing reduces average underpricing. Thus, firstday returns are sharply driven by grandstanding and spinning hypotheses, whose consistency is verified and supported by empirical evidence also when controlling for industries and years or when financial companies are excluded from the sample. We may conclude that VCs play a certification role only when grandstanding and spinning do not hold. 26 The following step of the analysis will be to figure out if trends and results found through the overall period occurred during the pre-crisis period and the financial crisis as well, or if the financial crisis is characterized by other outcomes.
relation between share overhang and first-day returns. Results found in this model are partially in line with what Habib and Ljungqvist (2000) and Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) said. They think that VCs care about the underpricing only <<if they stand to lose from it>>. Thus, if they do not sell shares (or if they sell just a little portion of their stakes), their incentive to control underpricing decreases strongly. This could lead to high underpricing of course, but it is not very clear why the previous statement should be always true. 26 An interesting consideration can be made about financial firms: they decrease underpricing consistently, probably thanks to their expertise (Peavy, 1990) .
Analysis of the pre-crisis period (2004-2007)
The number of IPOs considered in this period is 463, which is 91.32% of the whole sample. Year 2007 has been included in the pre-crisis sample because UK equity capital market had not been affected yet by the financial crisis that began in those days on the real estate market in
US.
27 Table XI shows the basic model used for previous analyses. All the predictors are exceptionally significant. UW DUMMY is the only insignificant variable using a 99% confidence level. Thus, venture-backing and prestigious underwriters increase underpricing during years before the financial crisis by 18.2% and 8.4%. The adjusted R-squared is slightly lower than usual (.146) and the F test gives back an excellent result (p-value = .000).
In the next regression GRANDSTANDING and SPINNING are added to the model.
Except for VC DUMMY and UW DUMMY, all the other variables are extremely significant. For this reason, we can assert that both grandstanding and spinning hypotheses stand during the precrisis years, confirming overall period findings. 28 After controlling for GRANDSTANDING and SPINNING, VC and UW DUMMY show again a negative coefficient, proving that VCs and prestigious UWs reduce average underpricing when grandstanding and spinning are isolated as predictors. The adjusted R-squared increases up to .164, which is a positive result, since underpricing is a very complex phenomenon that could be explained in several ways. The F-test provides with positive indications about the strength of the model (its p-value is .000).
Results show that models hold even if financial firms are excluded from the sample.
Grandstanding and spinning are slightly less significant than before, but confidence levels of 95% and 97% can still be used, thus the main assumptions of the model are confirmed. The model based on the whole sample and including grandstanding and spinning is controlled for industries and years, as well. Outcomes shown are the same as before, but AGE is significant only at a 95% confidence level. The adjusted R-squared reaches .161.
Insert Table XI Insert Table XII 29 Doubts arisen in the previous paragraph are not settled, since still too many interpretations may be given. Beside the significance, SHARE OVERHANG's coefficient is positive, as it was in regressions based on the overall period. However, UW DUMMY and VC DUMMY have negative betas after controlling for GRANDSTANDING and SPINNING. SALES / TOT.ASSETS, MONEY RAISED / TOT.ASSETS, AGE and FINANCIAL DUMMY keep their p-values close to .000, while GRANDSTANDING and SPINNING are significant at a 95% confidence level, which somehow proves their consistency.
Analysis of the crisis period (2008-2010)
The sample used for the following analysis contains only 44 observations, and includes TOT.ASSETS, do not explain the dependent variable at all. Beside the fact that the sample size is considerably small, equity capital market's performances may strongly affect the results. 30 AGE and SALES / TOT.ASSETS, which were considered proxies for risk, do not work efficiently anymore, plus a relation with underpricing is difficult to be found, given a very low or no first-day return. As far as MONEY RAISED / TOT. ASSETS is concerned, the insignificant output obtained can be 30 For example, if it was found that the average underpricing in those years was very low or slightly negative, there should be no differences between young and old companies. Very few IPOs occurred during the crisis for several reasons, and the market was not able to price properly going public firms. Furthermore, the majority of IPOs regards financial companies, which went public perhaps seeing some profitable investment opportunities somewhere, helped by their expertise and excellent skills in collecting good quality information. Thus, it is quite rational that variables such as AGE and SALES / TOT. ASSETS do not provide with any significant results, since relations with underpricing cannot be easily found when the latter does not even exist and stock exchanges totally collapse. Moreover, it has been stated that junk bonds and shares affected good securities also, while the cascade effect generated by the panic selling did not allow investors to recognize good and bad issues. Very few operators managed to act rationally, whereas the investor sentiment was strongly oriented to a negative direction.
justified by the same explanations given previously, plus money raised during the financial crisis decreased substantially, and this is supposed to reduce underpricing. 31 Although MONEY RAISED p-value is extremely high, the related coefficient is negative, giving signs (not supported by empirical evidence, though) that a smaller amount of money raised leads to lower underpricing. VC DUMMY and UW DUMMY are insignificant, as well. They were expected to have negative coefficients, because venture capital funds and prestigious underwriters are not supposed to increase underpricing in recession periods, since they cannot fight the negative trend given by the market.
Again, explanations given are rational but cannot be supported by statistical evidence.
Last step regards GRANDSTANDING and SPINNING. As for the previous regression, SALES / TOT. ASSETS, MONEY RAISED / TOT. ASSETS and AGE are not significant, while FINANCIAL DUMMY can be taken into account at a confidence level of .982. FINANCIAL DUMMY has a negative coefficient once again. GRANDSTANDING and SPINNING are totally insignificant, but they are not expected to hold over the time horizon considered. In fact, venture capitalists encounter several difficulties when exiting through IPOs during crises plus they have to deal with the negative sentiment of the market, that does not allow the initial offer price to raise once securities are available for trading. Thus, it is really difficult to underprice shares, and the scenario more likely to happen is that underpricing is close to zero, or there might be just little adjustments upward or downward the initial offer price. 32 In any case the model does not have any statistical relevance here, as proved by the low adjusted R-squared (.03) and by the high p-value shown by the F-test (.35). Thus, empirical evidence does not support previous interpretations.
Although crisis models are not statistically useful, it can be argued that grandstanding and spinning theories do not hold after bubbles burst, as pointed out by Coakley et al. (2006) , who conducted a 31 Explanations about why VCs do not raise so much money and what kind of problems they face during crises are given by Block and Sandner (2009) . They argue that the amount of money raised decreases because the main investors in venture capital funds are institutional, such as pension funds, insurance companies and banks. During hard times, these kind of institutions are not interested in placing the few resources they have in risky investments, that are more likely to fail due to difficulties encountered. The second main issue regards the severe problems VCs face when exiting. As seen in section 3, time to exit increases dramatically during crises. Going public becomes more costly, and the amount of money raised is not expected to be high, since investors will run away from the equity capital market. Thus, the amount of money raised by VCs depends on how hot the issue period is (Black and Gilson, 1998) . This would explain why underpricing and money raised are strongly tied in a bull market. Thirdly, VCs are not able to invest in profitable firms during recessions, since it is not easy to generate long-lasting streams of cash flows while consumers diminish their expenses. This leads to lower effective rates of return, given a higher risk though, which is not the optimal allocation solution, financially speaking. 32 Anyway, since VCs do not have investment opportunities to catch, they have no heist in exiting from their investments. Moreover, even if VCs were able to find profitable investments to undertake, two more issues would arise. First of all, since the cost of going public is extremely high, IPOs would not be convenient anymore if the main aim is cashing out. Secondly, they would not be able to have access to new funds. Fund-raising is an incredibly complicated activity during crises. Only mature and high-reputation VCs may be able to raise money in dark periods and try to gain returns over their investments. Furthermore, given the decreasing trends of the share price, the spinning practice becomes impossible. VCs and prestigious UWs are not able to artificially underprice shares, because they cannot be sure that the volume of buy orders on that security will be high enough to increase substantially the initial offer price after the first-day of trading (and not only).
similar study on the UK Main Market using a different time horizon and proving that spinning is significant only during the dotcom bubble, which is the hot issue period analyzed in their sample.
Insert Table XIII about here 
Limits of research
Although findings previously shown are supported by a broad literature (Gompers, 1996; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2000; Bradley and Jordan, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Gompers et al., 2005) , it's our duty to discuss the limits of the research. First of all, it
is not possible to support the assumptions and considerations made for the financial crisis period (2008) (2009) (2010) through empirical evidence. This happens because a few IPOs occurred all over that period of time, thus the size of the sample used for analysis is not robust enough for significant tests. In addition, underpricing is negative or close to zero during the financial crisis period, therefore it is quite hard to explain it through significant predictors. Secondly, UW DUMMY is not totally built through a validated ranking for underwriters. Unfortunately, Carter and Manaster assigned a rank to US banks, thus UWs sponsoring IPOs in the sample are not always found in their list. The criterion built to assign ranks to those underwriters not taken into account by Carter and Manaster has been clearly specified, but it must be said that it might not be considered representative of the reality. Thus, a bias could be generated over a variable that assumes a critical role in this research, since it is also used to create the proxy representing the spinning theory.
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Finally, some issues regarding venture capitalists must be discussed. Firstly, it was not possible to collect information about venture capital funds' age, thus models do not clarify if grandstanding phenomenon is more related to young VCs or if their age does not matter. Nevertheless, what has been said about grandstanding and its statistical significance may lead to conclude that the majority of VCs heading companies to the AIM is young and still have to deal with reputational problems.
Furthermore, information about pre-IPO ownership structures has been collected by IPO prospectuses. So, whenever a venture capital fund exited through an M&A deal some years before the IPO, such information has been missed and that observation considered non-venture capital backed. In any case, since the majority of VC backed IPOs are grandstanded (hence, going public firms were aged zero to four), an M&A deal is unlikely to happen at least for 75% of VC backed observations. Lastly, venture-backing could be an endogenous choice (Lee and Wahal, 2004) . Some entrepreneurs do not want venture capitalists to manage their firms, or they are not able to get their financing. Thus, when arguing that venture-backing provokes some effects, it is not sure that those effects are caused by venture capitalists. It might be that VCs prefer to invest in companies already experiencing similar effects, thus venture-backing would not actually generate any of them. As shown by Bradley and Jordan (2002) , VC backed IPOs are generally more underpriced, but they do not address the cause of underpricing to venture-backing itself, but they argue that VCs usually invest in already high underpriced industries.
Conclusion
The aim of this research was to verify whether venture capitalists increase average underpricing of going public companies. In literature, a broad school of thought proved empirically that venture capital backed IPOs are more underpriced, on average. As discussed in previous sections, the most popular explanations of this phenomenon lead to grandstanding and spinning theories. Our contribution regards the time period (which includes the 2008 financial crisis and its effects and implications) and the country analyzed. Despite of the fact that UK equity capital market is one of the most developed in the world and the closest to the US one, most of the studies about underpricing have been undertaken on the US market. Moreover, UK is the most relevant European country for venture capitalists, since they play a vital role in the whole British economy, and the AIM Market serves as an ideal marketplace for their exit process. We thought this was fairly enough to demand an action to fill the gap by providing new research on the UK market.
Regressions clearly show that assumptions of grandstanding and spinning by VCs stand all over the period considered and during the pre-crisis years (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Nevertheless, the reduced size of the sample regarding the financial crisis period (2008) (2009) (2010) does not allow to make any statistically significant conclusion about those years, although none of the considered theories should hold during negative economic cycles.
Our new empirical evidence leads to state that agency theory issues, such as grandstanding and spinning, do affect Venture Capital backed IPOs' underpricing. Moral hazard behaviors are in fact likely to occur whenever principal and agent's interests are not aligned, thus conclusions underline arising conflicts of interests between venture capitalists, underwriters and firms that go public during hot issue periods, as shown by Arthurs et al. (2008), and Gifford (1997) .
Nevertheless, after controlling for grandstanding and spinning we find evidence that venture capitalists and prestigious underwriters reduce underpricing, again in line with previous evidence (Barry et. al., 1990; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991 Grandstanding and spinning are not meant to be the only explanations for underpricing.
Venture capital backed IPOs are generally perceived as high-quality issues by the market, hence it may be asserted that part of the underpricing generated during hot issue periods is simply given by the positive sentiment featuring equity capital markets (Ritter, 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2002 This table contains a further development of the basic model on the pre-crisis period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . In Column I the model includes the share overhang variable, calculated as the ratio between shares retained by VC funds/total shares issued, while in Column II the model is tested again introducing the Maturity Index that is calculated as the age multiplied by the ratio Sales/Total Assets. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. This table measures the underpricing of IPOs on the AIM UK Market during the post-crisis period (2008) (2009) (2010) in an OLS regression framework. Column I contains the results of the basic model when a dummy on IPOs belonging to the financial sectors (financial dummy) is introduced whereas Column II extends the results of the model by introducing dummies for grandstanding and spinning. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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